This paper makes research on a secure hybrid satellite-terrestrial communication network with eavesdroppers at the primary and secondary receivers. To secure the transmitted messages, we adopt the null space beamforming to the amplified-and-forward (AF) relay protocol and weighted fractional data carrying artificial noise (WFDCAN) to the decoded-and-forward (DF) relay protocol at the satellite. Considering the time delay may be brought by the WFDCAN, we introduce a parameter θ to indicate the delay severity. The secrecy capacity is combined with θ to derive the maximum secrecy delay constrain. The secrecy capacity, the ASER of the up-link channel and the delay constrain of the down-link channel are applied as factors for a three level relay protocol selection scheme. To simplify the analyses and expressions, the models of the AF protocol and the DF protocol are integrated to form a new transmission model. Furthermore, the secrecy performance at the destination receiver is considered for terrestrial relay selection to enhance the security performance. We also apply the columns of the frequency hopping based multi-term weighted fractional fourier transform (FH-MWFRFT) matrix as signal processing vector to the base station of the terrestrial network to minimize the interference it brings to the terrestrial relays. The simulation results demonstrate that the proposed system could maintain the security at the relays and the secondary receiver while reducing the delay at the satellite in some conditions. INDEX TERMS AF/DF selection, communication delay, secure communication, satellite communication, weighted fractional fourier transform.
areas in these years. Reference [4] presented a novel cognitive hybrid satellite-terrestrial model, where two cognitive relays forward their received signal for a mobile user successively and then formulated the maximization of the achievable rate as an optimization problem. The average error performance of a hybrid satellite-terrestrial communication system with relay earth station selection is derived in terms of Meijer-G functions by using MGF approach [5] . And in [6] , the ergodic channel capacity of the down-link channel in a hybrid satellite-terrestrial cooperative system is analyzed. Nevertheless, the security, interference, service delay and the trade off among these factors have always been problems that is worthy to be studied.
The open access character of satellite communication makes security an important issue. There are mainly two kinds of methods to keep the transmission secured. One is applying encryption before transmission to secure the message, which has been studied in many aspects [7] , [8] . The other is the method called physical layer security started by Wyner [9] . The beamforming and the artificial noise (AN) are two types of technologies that are applied to achieve physical layer security. Reference [10] investigated the secrecy capacity of a multi-antenna amplify-and-forward (AF) hybrid satellite-terrestrial relay network by employing a two-stage beamforming (BF) scheme, where the relay first adopts the maximal ratio combining (MRC) to receive the signal from satellite and then performs zero-forcing (ZF) to completely null the eavesdropper's signal. Then [11] investigated the secrecy performance of a hybrid satellite-terrestrial relay network in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers based on beamforming. Reference [12] studies the secure transmit beamforming design for a down-link MIMO cognitive radio network with a practical energy harvesting (EH) model. To implement the beamforming method, the channel state information (CSI) of the eavesdropping channel is required. The AN technology, on the other hand, only requires the CSI of the main channel, which makes it easier to realize. This feature has drawn AN technology more attentions. By applying the secure beamforming and AN technology for a cognitive satellite-terrestrial network, the total transmission power at the satellite and multiple terrestrial base stations could be minimized, while meeting the secrecy rate constraint of the primary satellite user along with the signal-to-interference plus noise ratio (SINR) constraints of secondary terrestrial users [13] . Reference [14] minimized the transmit power by jointly optimizing the cooperative beamforming and AN while guaranteeing the secrecy rate constraint for satellite link, the information rate constraint for terrestrial link and the total transmit power constraint. Reference [15] designed a cooperative secure transmission beamforming scheme, which is realized through the satellite's adaptive beamforming, AN and base stations' cooperative beamforming implemented by terrestrial base stations to maximize the achievable secrecy rate of the eavesdropped fixed satellite service. AN technology could also be applied to secure the simultaneous wireless information and power transfer systems [16] , [17] . Since the energy for AN is always wasted at each legitimate receiver, [17] proposed an AN assisted interference alignment scheme with wireless power transfer, where the energy for AN was harvested at the receivers. After being enciphered [18] or processed by frequency-hopping multi-term weighted fractional fourier transform (FH-MWFRFT) [19] , the signals could perform as ANs to deteriorate the receiving performance at the eavesdroppers. FH-MWFRFT is a time-frequency analysis tool developed from weighted fractional fourier transform (WFRFT), which was first applied in communication [20] . The FH-MWFRFT is designed to solve the simplicity of the parameter in traditional 4-WFRFT. Via adopting frequency hopping to the kernel part of MWFRFT, the pattern of the traditional 4-WFRFT coefficients and matrix become more random, which could not be deciphered even by the eavesdropper with the transform order. However, since the data carrying AN technology needs to process the signal before transmission, its delay may be longer than the NSBF. Thus, selecting the proper relay protocol according to the performance requirements and different conditions would be necessary.
Acting as a relay in the system, the satellite always works in two relay protocols, including amplified-and-forward (AF) and decoding-and-forward (DF). These two kinds of relay protocols have different characters and are often integrated by a selection scheme in relaying communication networks [21] , [22] . An adaptive AF and DF selection scheme for two-way relay networks was proposed with an optimal switching scheme that allowed the relay switching between full-duplex and half-duplex modes to improve the outage performance [21] . The hybrid-decode/amplify-and-forward (HDAF) relay protocol was employed to a mixed radio frequency-free space optical system to enhance the average symbol error rate performance and the channel capacity [22] . The performance of an opportunistic DFâĂ"AF selection scheme for cognitive relay networks was also analysed and compared with the traditional DF and direct transmission (DT) schemes [23] .
Since the developing of 5G communication make the integration of satellite communication with terrestrial possible, the communication security and delay should also be taken into consideration in satellite communication system. In this paper, we focus on the security and service delay of a satellite-terrestrial communication network with both the AF and DF relay protocols at the satellite and AF relay protocol at the terrestrial relays. Here, the NSBF and weighted fractional data carrying artificial noise (WFDCAN) are applied to the AF protocol and DF protocol to secure the satellite down-link transmission, respectively. The communication delay could be indicated by a parameter θ [24] . Combining this parameter with the secrecy capacity of the down-link channel, we propose a constrain called maximum secrecy delay constrain to indicate the maximum service delay of a transmission under certain secrecy capacity. We then propose a three levels AF/DF selection scheme that taking the ASER of the up-link channel, the secrecy capacity and the secrecy delay constrain into consideration to reduce the communication delay and maintain the reliable and secrecy performance simultaneously. To maximize the security performance at the destination receiver, we formulate an optimization problem based on the SINR at the receiver and propose a relay selection scheme according to the solution of problem. To minimize the interference brought by the terrestrial network, we introduce the FH-MWFRFT matrix to process the signal transmitted by the terrestrial base station. We also consider the situations that the satellite has perfect or imperfect channel state information (CSI) of the down-link channel. The CSI would affect the result of relay protocol selection to some extent. The contribution of this paper could be summarized as follows:
• To simplified the expression and analysing, we compare the similarities and differences of the models under AF VOLUME 7, 2019 relay protocol and DF relay protocol. Then we introduce a parameter a ∈ {0, 1} to combine these two models together to form a new model for analysing and relay protocol selection.
• We introduce a parameter θ to indicate the severity of communication delay and combine it with the secrecy capacity of the down-link channel to derive the expression of the maximum secrecy delay constrain of the transmission. Afterwards we derive the expression for the average symbol error rate ASER) of the up-link channel. Then we propose a three levels AF/DF relay protocol selection scheme by taking the ASER of the up-link channel, the secrecy capacity and the maximum secrecy delay constrain of the down-link channel into consideration.
• We also apply the FH-MWFRFT to the signal transmitted by the base station of the terrestrial network to minimize the interference brought by it. By cooperatively using the FH-MWFRFT matrix, the orthogonality between the columns and rows of the FH-MWFRFT matrix is utilized to achieve this objective.
• We formulate a optimization problem based on the SINR at the destination receiver. The solution of the problem is applied to select the best terrestrial relay to maximize the secrecy capacity at the receiver. The upper bounds of the secrecy capacity at the destination receiver with different relay protocols are derived. The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section II introduces the system model of this paper in detail. In section III, we derive the expression of the maximum secrecy delay constrain and the ASER of the up-link channel. Based on the delay constrain and the ASER, the AF/DF relay protocol selection scheme is proposed. Then we formulate and propose the optimization problem for terrestrial relay selection and the interference minimization scheme for the base station of the terrestrial network in section IV. The simulation results and relative analyses are given in section V. Finally, we draw conclusion in section VI. Notations: The following notation is used through the paper. Bold-face lowercase type denotes vectors and the uppercase type denotes matrixes. Scalars are denoted by lowercase. (·) H , · and | · | denote conjugate transpose, the Forbenius norm (Euclidean norm for a vector) and the matrix determinant, respectively. [a] + represents max{0, a} and ·, · represents the inner product of two vectors. log(·) refers to the natural logarithm log e (·). The notations are shown clearly in the table below:
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In the coexistence system of satellite network and terrestrial network, we consider the scenario as shown in Fig.1 . In this scenario, an earth station exchange messages with a legitimate receiver through a satellite and several terrestrial relays. The earth station, the satellite and the terrestrial relays are equipped with N 1 , N s and N r antennas, respectively. There is a terrestrial base station with N b antennas and its associated signal antenna users within the coverage of the satellite. A multi-antenna eavesdropper E 1 with N e1 antennas and an eavesdropper E 2 with N e2 antennas are located inside the coverage of the satellite and near the secondary receiver D respectively attempting to wiretap the signal transmitted to the relays and the receiver. In the first hop, ES 1 transmits signals to satellite S, The signals are processed at the satellite and relayed to the terrestrial relays R i in the second hop, which are wiretapped by the eavesdropper E 1 . The signals transmitted by the base station BS would affect the normal receiving of the relays. At the third hop, the signals are relayed to the secondary receiver D. E 2 is near D and tries to eavesdrop the signals.
A. CHANNEL MODEL
In this paper, we assume the satellite channel to be shadow-rician channel, which is a channel model that have been used in related works for satellite communication [25] . In this model, the channel fading coefficient h SR is defined as:
where ψ is a stationary random phase vector whose elements are uniformly distributed over [0, 2π ). ζ is the deterministic phase vector of the LOS component. A and Z are the amplitude of the NLOS(non line of sight) and LOS (line of sight) components. They are Rayleigh distributed and Nakagami-m distributed indenpendent stationary random processes. The shadow-rician fading distribution could be discribed by three parameters: b, half of the average power of the NLOS, , the average power of the LOS component and m, the Nakagami-m parameter corresponding to the fading severity. The regular value of the parameters that characterized the shadow-rician channel are given in table 2 according to [26] . Meanwhile, we assume the terrestrial links are rayleigh fading channel. That is to say, the channel undergoes the rayleigh fading, whose elements are independent and identical distributed (i.i.d) complex gaussian random variables. Thus, |h R | is subject to the rayleigh distribution, whose probability density function is [27] :
. , x n s ) T represents the signal transmitted by the earth station, where s is the information vector, x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n s are the symbols of s and W α FHM is the FH-MWFRFT matrix, which is introduced in [19] in detail. The definition of FH-MWFRFT is given by
where M is the number of the terms of MWFRFT, B α M ,k m and W (·) FH 4 are the MWFRFT coefficient and the FH-WFRFT matrix, whose expressions are given by
The coefficient ω l(FH ) and matrix F FH are the WFRFT coefficient and discrete fourier transform (DFT) matrix after frequency hopping. The definition of ω α l(FH ) is given by
and the element in the frequency hopping improved DFT matrix has the form of
in the expressions above, N F is the size of the DFT matrix. d is the corresponding decimal number of the frequency hopping sequence and n(d) is the new period of the FH-DFT matrix related to d.
Denoting the channel gain matrix between the earth station ES 1 and the satellite to be H 1S ∈ C N S ×N 1 , the signal received by the satellite after orthogonal space-time block coding (OSTBC) could be given by:
where P 1 is the transmission power at the earth station ES 1 and N 1S is the additive gaussian white noise (AWGN) in the ES 1 -S channel. N 1S obeys the distribution of CN (0, σ 2 1S I). s is processed by FH-MWFRFT to protect it from being eavesdropped by the local eavesdroppers near the ES 1 . X O1 is the signal after OSTBC, whose definition is given by
The satellite applies two protocols to relay the received signal to the terrestrial relays, the AF protocol and the DF protocol. When the satellite works on the AF protocol, the signal is transmitted directly to the terrestrial after being amplified. To secure the signal from being wiretapped by the eavesdropper E 1 , the satellite acquire the CSI of the S − E 1 channel to perform the NSBF to the transmitted signal. Denoting the transmitting power of the satellite to be P S , then the amplifying gain of the AF protocol is given as G S = P S E{|Y S | 2 } . Thus the signal received at the terrestrial relays and eavesdropper E 1 under the AF relay protocol are given as:
where H Si ∈ C N r ×N S and H Se ∈ C N e1 ×N S are the channel gain matrix of the channel between the satellite and the terrestrial relay R i and the eavesdropper E 1 . W 0 = V 0 / √ N r is the NSBF matrix. V 0 is the eigen matrix of H Se corresponding to the zero eigenvalue and is acquired via the singular value decomposition (SVD). N Si ∼ CN (0, σ 2 Si I) and N Se ∼ CN (0, σ 2 Se I) are the AWGN of the S − R i and S − E 1 channel. H bi ∈ C N r ×N b and H be ∈ C N r ×N b are the channel gain matrix of the channel between the terrestrial base station and the ith relay.
} is the transmitted signal of the base station. u b is the signal processing vector and s b is the information vector of the terrestrial base station. X bO1 is the OSTBC matrix of the base station signal.
While working on the DF protocol, the satellite decodes the signal received from ES 1 and further processed it for transmission. The WFDCAN technology is applied here to enhance the security, which is developed from the FH-MWFRFT and has many merits such as no need of accurate CSI of the eavesdropping channel and could make use of the transmission power more efficiently [19] . Multiple signals are processed by different columns of the FH-MWFRFT matrix and transmitted simultaneously. Denoting
and transmitting the signal after OSTBC, the signal received by the terrestrial relays after inverse FH-MWFRFT processing and the eavesdropper E 1 under the DF relay protocol are given by:
where w FHM j is the jth column of the FH-MWFRFT matrix and η j is the power allocation ratio of the jth signal. P S j is the transmission power for the jth signal. η j is acquired before transmission via a power and time allocation method [19] . N is the total transmitted number of the signals. X SO1 = x S11 −x * S12
x S12 x * S11 is the signal transmitted by the satellite after OSTBC. According to (10), (11), (13) and (14), we could combine the signal model under these two different relay protocol via introducing a parameter a ∈ {0, 1}, the merged model of received signal at the relays and the eavesdropper are given by:
where
The signal transmitted from the base station would affect the receiving of the terrestrial relays. The interference could usually be minimized after specially designment of the signal processing vector u b . Then the signal is relayed to the secondary receiver with AF relay protocol while an eavesdropper E 2 is attempting to wiretap the relayed signal besides the receiver. Denoting H iD ∈ C N D ×N r and H ie ∈ C N e2 ×N r to be the channel gain matrix of the R i − D channel and R i − E 2 channel respectively, the signal received at the secondary receiver and E 2 are given by:
where G ri = P ri E{|y R i | 2 } is the gain at the ith relay with P ri being the transmission power for the terrestrial relay i.
To acquire the transmitted messages, the secondary receiver need to implement OSTBC decoding to the received signal. Denoting
= H a Ge as generalized channel matrix, and taking the situation of N r = 2 as an example for simplicity, the OSTBC decoding procedure could be given by
x S11 x S12
According to (15) , (16), (17) and (18), the SINR at the terrestrial relay i, secondary receiver, eavesdropper E 1 and E 2 could be derived as:
III. AF/DF SELECTION SCHEME BASED ON DELAY AND ASER ANALYSES
In this section, we firstly introduce the parameter θ to indicate the severity of delay based on the introduction of statistic delay constrains. Then we derive the expression of maximum secrecy delay constrain. We also analyse the ASER of the up-link channel of the satellite and finally, we propose the AF/DF selection scheme based on the analyses of delay and ASER.
A. THE MAXIMUM SECRECY DELAY CONSTRAIN
We assume that the extra communication delay is mainly brought in the DF relay procedure, where the satellite need to buffer multiple signals to adopt the WFDCAN. Thus we analyse the communication delay based on the conception of statistic delay constrains. Suppose that the buffer queue is stable and that the arrive process ar[n] and the service process sr[n] satisfy the Gartner-Ellis limit, i.e. for a parameter θ 0, differentiable logarithmic moment generating functions (LMGF) ar (θ ) and sr (θ ) exist which satisfy lim n→∞ log E{ n n i =1 ar[n]} n = ar (θ ) lim n→∞ log E{ n n i =1 sr[n]} n = sr (θ ). If a unique θ > 0 exists such that ar (θ) + sr (−θ ) = 0, then [28] lim
where Q B is the stationary queue length. We could infer from (22) that the tail distribution of the stationary queue length decays exponentially. Specially, for a large Q Bmax , the approximation Pr{Q B > Q Bmax } ≈ e −θ Q Bmax exists, which means that while larger θ refers to a stricter constrain, smaller θ would correspond to a weaker constrain.
We introduce a pair of parameters (ε, De max ) to indicate the worst the statistic delay performance of the communication, where ε is the limitation on the statistical delay violation probability, De max is the maximum tolerable service time delay. It represents the maximum tolerable delay brought by the service procedure at the satellite. Assuming the buffer queue is always attempt to transmit [29] . Then, the queueing delay violation probability could be expressed equivalently as [30] , [31] Pr{De
is the statistical delay exponent associated with the service process.
Under the block fading assumption, the relationship between the instantaneous capacity C and the LMGF of the service processes of the buffer queue is given as [24] :
after replacing the instantaneous capacity with the secrecy capacity, we could obtain the connection between the LMGF and the secrecy capacity as:
where C s = [log 2 (1 + γ R i ) − log 2 (1 + γ E 1 )] + is the secrecy capacity of the satellite down-link channel. Therefore, according to (24) and (26), we could have:
Lemma 1: The function above has the following properties.
Proof: See Appendix A We could infer from the properties above that J (θ ) is equal to 0 when θ = 0, and then it would increase with θ until reaching an upperbound. Therefore we could set a threshold according to the parameter ε and De max , which is given as [24] 
where W −1 (·) denotes the Lambert W function. According to (27) and (28), the expression for the maximum secrecy delay constrain could be derived as:
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Remark 1: When the ε and θ are determined, the maximum secrecy delay constrain is mainly affected by the secrecy capacity of the down-link channel. Thus we could write it as De max (C s ). Since the inverse exponential function is a monotonously decreasing function and the logarithmic function is a monotonously increasing function, the maximum secrecy delay constrain would be a monotonously increasing function of the secrecy capacity. Moreover, we have De max (0) = 0, i.e. when the secrecy capacity is zero, the transmission could not tolerate any delay, which refers to a strict constrain. The transmission is not possible under this constrain.
B. THE ASER ANALYSIS OF THE UP-LINK CHANNEL
The ASER of the up-link channel is mainly determined by the SINR at the satellite. According to (8) , the SINR at the satellite is given as:
Due to the property of FH-MWFRFT, the norm of the FH-MWFRFT matrix is also one, i.e. W α
1. Then (30) could be rewritten as:
The up-link channel is assumed to be a shadow-rician fading channel, thus the p.d.f of H 1S 2 is given as [26] :
where α c = 0.5(2bm/(2bm + )) m /b, β = 0.5/b, δ = 0.5 /(2b 2 m + b ). Noting that the α c here is a parameter of the channel instead of the transform order of the FH-MWFRFT.
To calculate the ASER of the up-link channel, we need to acquire the moment generation function (MGF), which is calculated by Mg γ (s) = E[e sγ ]. Thus the MGF of γ S is given as:
By substituting (32) into (33), we could derive the approximate expression of the MGF of γ S .
Theorem 1: The MGF of γ s is given as:
Proof: See Appendix B
According to [27] and [32] , the ASER of a M-PSK signal could be calculated by:
By substituting (34) into (35) , the ASER of the up-link channel could be derived as:
C. THE PROPOSED THREE LEVEL AF/DF SELECTION SCHEMES
We take the theoretical ASER of the average fading environment, the secrecy capacity and the derived maximum secrecy delay constrain in the previous subsections as standards for comparison when selecting the relay protocol. The proposed three level AF/DF selection scheme (TLSS) is shown in Fig.2 . The scheme always aims to choose the proper relay protocol to provide a better ASER performance and a less communication delay. The priority in the proposed scheme is Reliability > Security > Delay. In this hybrid satellite-terrestrial network, the satellite makes the decision to select the relay protocol by estimating the ASER of the up-link channel and the delay of the down-link channel. Here we deem that the error symbols would bring interference to the signal relayed by the DF protocol and consequently deteriorate the transmission rate. Taking the deviation between the actual and theoretical value, we apply the mid-value of the maximum deviation and the minimum deviation under the average fading environment as a standard deviation. Denoting the standard deviation as δ A , when the actual ASER at the satellite is δ A greater than the average fading theoretical value, the satellite selects the AF relay protocol, otherwise, it chooses the DF relay protocol. After that the satellite would estimate the delay of the down-link channel. If the delay is less than the maximum secrecy delay constrain, the satellite would keep the DF relay protocol. Or the AF relay protocol would be selected. Since the secrecy performance of NSBF depends on the CSI, the maximum secrecy delay constrain of the AF and DF relay protocol would be compared after the AF protocol is reselected to finally decide which relay protocol should be selected. The detail of the selection scheme is given below. Case 1: When ASER is δ A greater than the theoretical ASER, i.e.ASER > (1 + δ A )ASER th , the satellite selects the AF relay protocol, which indicates that a = 1.
Case 2: When ASER is not δ A greater than the theoretical value, the satellite would select the DF relay protocol, i.e. a = 0. Then it would calculate the delay by the expression below:
where T s is the time of a symbol and n is the number of symbols in a signal. 
IV. INTERFERENCE MINIMIZATION AND TERRESTRIAL RELAY SELECTION
This section mainly discusses the terrestrial relay selection scheme and the terrestrial network interference minimization. The performance is characterized due to the secrecy capacity at the destination receiver, which is denoted as C sD and could be given by:
Analytical expressions of C sD are derived in this section, which taken the interference minimization scheme into consideration.
A. TERRESTRIAL NETWORK INTERFERENCE MINIMIZATION SCHEME
In the hybrid satellite-terrestrial network, the terrestrial relays would always be interfered by the terrestrial communication network. Thus it is necessary to minimize the interference from the terrestrial network. Beamforming is a common applied method in interference minimization that have been studied a lot [33] , [34] . Here we apply the FH-MWFRFT to minimize the interference. The terrestrial base station using one column of the FH-MWFRFT matrix with same parameter as a beamforming vector, i.e. u b = w α FHM b . The received signal is processed with the corresponding row of the matrix at the terrestrial relays after channel equalization. According to (15) , the signal after processing is given by:
where H C bi is the channel equalization matrix at the ith terrestrial relay and w −α FHM b is the FH-MWFRFT vector at relay R i .
Theorem 2: The multiplication result of non-corresponding columns and rows of the FH-MWFRFT matrix with corresponding parameters is zero
The orthogonality between the columns and rows of the FH-MWFRFT matrix could be beneficial to the interference minimization in complexity. Via applying the column of FH-MWFRFT matrix as the signal processing vector, the terrestrial interference could be minimized without optimization procedure. Moreover, the orthogonality only exists between the columns and rows of the FH-MWFRFT matrix with the corresponding parameters, the receiver without the parameters could not implement the interference cancellation successfully.
Theorem 2 ensures that the interference brought by the terrestrial base station could be minimized. Since the eavesdropper E 1 does not have the knowledge of the parameters of the FH-MWFRFT, the signal transmitted by the terrestrial base station would further deteriorate the SINR at E 1 , and consequently, improve the secrecy performance. The signal is transmitted to the destination receiver by AF relay protocol after the FH-MWFRFT vector after the equalization matrix are neutralized. When the DF relay protocol is selected, the WFDCANs are removed by the destination receiver. According to (17) and (39), the signal received at D is given by:
By applying the properties of (w −α FHM b ) H w −α FHM b = 1 and (H C bi ) −1 H C bi = I, the terrestrial relays multiply (w −α FHM b ) H and (H C bi ) −1 to the signal after interference cancellation to remove the FH-MWFRFT vector and OSTBC decoding matrix brought in during the cancellation. Then the signal is given byȲ
Then the terrestrial relays adopts the beamforming matrix V i toȲ R i and forward the signal to the secondary receiver with AF protocol. According to (17) and (41), the signal received at D is given by
B. TERRESTRIAL RELAY SELECTION SCHEME.
The beamforming matrix V i would affect the performance of the communication, a specially designed V i could improve the secrecy. Considering the restrictions such as the existence of channel null space, we apply the more complicated yet less restricted zero-forcing beamforming [25] to the transmitted signal at the terrestrial relay and formulate V i as
I is a unity matrix with the dimension of N r × N r and V i0 is a random matrix with the dimension of N r × N D .
Remark 3: When the CSI of the channel to E 2 is not perfect, the signals are still secured by the FH-MWFRFT. Even though the transmitted signals are leaked to the wiretap channel due to CSI imperfection, the eavesdropper could not acquire the transmitted information without correct transform parameters either. Thus the transmission would still be safe in this condition.
After designing V i for the terrestrial relays, we need to focus on the security at the destination receiver, which is as important as that at the terrestrial relays. Thus the secrecy performance at the destination receiver is considered as the criterion to select the optimal relay to achieve the maximum secrecy capacity. The SINR is the dominating factor to the secrecy capacity. According to (20) , (21) and (42), the SINR at the destination receiver is given by:
For the eavesdropper, the knowledge of the FH-MWFRFT parameter is not available. The WFDCANs applied with the DF protocol or the other terms of the FH-MWFRFT signal transmitted with the AF protocol would be the interference at the eavesdropper E 2 . Therefore, the SINR at the eavesdropper E 2 is given by
according to the definition of secrecy capacity and the monotonicity of logarithmic function, the selection scheme is given by
where S is the set of terrestrial relays. Theorem 3: The maximum achievable secrecy capacity of the AF and DF relay protocol at different SINRs are given by
DSi * +σ 2 i * D L i * ) Proof: See Appendix D Since the upper bound of the secrecy capacity is affected by the random channel matrix, we adopt the mean value of (47) and (48) as the theoretical upper bound of the secrecy capacity at the destination receiver. 
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we are going to present the simulation result and discussions. The results are compared with the analytical results and some other methods to validate the performance of the proposed methods in this paper. The secrecy performance at the terrestrial relays and the destination and the service delay at the satellite are discussed. The earth station, satellite, terrestrial relays and the terrestrial base station are assumed to equip with two antennas, i.e. N 1 = N S = N r = N b = 2. The destination receiver and the eavesdroppers are assumed to equip with one antenna. The threshold of the transmission rate for the scheme in [21] and for the secrecy outage probability is set as 3 and 2.5 respectively.
We demonstrate the simulation and theoretical ASER of the up-link channel at the satellite firstly in Fig.3 . According to the results, the simulation value of the ASER at the satellite could fit the theoretical value with some deviation. The best ASER performance is achieved under the light fading environment while the heavy fading environment would lead to the worst reliability performance. Since the performance of the average fading channel falls in between the best and worst one, it is reasonable to apply the deviation of average fading channel as a standard to estimate the reliability performance of the up-link channel.
We compare the secrecy capacity at the terrestrial relay and the average service time delay of the proposed TLSS relay protocol selection scheme, the secrecy capacity only selection scheme (SCOS), which selects the relay protocol only according to secrecy capacity and the selection scheme in [21] with perfect CSI of the down-link eavesdropper channel in Fig.4 and Fig.5 . To make the simulation simple, we assume the channel between satellite and the terrestrial relays are the same. The transmission power of the earth station is set as P 1 = 60dBm. Both the three fading environment are considered here. According to the simulation results, the TLSS could achieve the best secrecy performance in these three schemes under the average fading and light fading environment. The secrecy capacity achieved by the SCOS is almost the same under these two fading conditions. However, . The comparison of the secrecy capacity at the terrestrial relays among the TLSS, SCOS and the scheme in [21] under three fading environments with P 1 = 60dBm and perfect CSI. as the transmission power of the satellite increasing, the TLSS overruns the SCOS. The main reason is that the SCOS only applied the secrecy capacity as selecting criterion, which does not take the ASER at the satellite into consideration. Thus it would always choose the DF relay protocol, whose secrecy performance is affected by the ASER and surpassed by the AF relay protocol. While under the heavy fading condition, the ASER at the satellite is not good enough, therefore the TLSS turns to the AF relay protocol to maintain the reliability, whose secrecy performance is not as good as the DF relay protocol when P S < 54dBm. On the other hand, the average service fading time delay of the TLSS is the best among these three schemes under the heavy fading channel since it intends to select the AF relay protocol. When the average fading or light fading channel are involved, the time delay performance of the TLSS exceeds the SCOS, who would always select the DF relay protocol, and is larger than the scheme in [21] , who would switch from AF to DF at a transmission power level according to the channel environment.
The comparison of the secrecy capacity at the terrestrial relay and the average service time delay of the three selection schemes with imperfect down-link CSI of the eavesdropper FIGURE 6. The comparison of the secrecy capacity at the terrestrial relays among the TLSS, SCOS and the scheme in [21] under three fading environments with P 1 = 60dBm and imperfect CSI. [21] under three fading environments with P 1 = 60dBm and imperfect CSI. channel is given in Fig.6 and Fig.7 . We assume here that there exists a gaussian error in the estimation of CSI. The transmission power of the earth station is also set as 60dBm here, i.e. P 1 = 60dBm. The secrecy performance of the three schemes are almost the same as those under the perfect CSI condition. The differences are mainly demonstrated in two sides. The first is that the TLSS has to sacrifice more secrecy capacity to maintain the reliability under the heavy fading environment due to the error in CSI estimation decreases the secrecy capacity that could be achieved by the AF relay protocol. The second is that since the secrecy performance of the AF relay protocol is worse than the DF relay protocol when P S is large, all these three schemes achieves the same secrecy capacity under average fading or light fading environment. However, the scheme in [21] could not match with the other two schemes when P S < 40dBm(average fading channel) and P S < 38dBm(light fading channel) as it does not take secrecy performance into consideration. The average service time delay of the TLSS is less than the other two schemes under the heavy fading environment since it makes more selection to the AF relay protocol. With the decreasing of ASER under the average fading and light fading environment, FIGURE 8. The comparison of the secrecy capacity at the terrestrial relays among the TLSS, SCOS and the scheme in [21] with presence of multiple eavesdroppers. the TLSS would select more DF relay protocol, which makes the average time delay increase to the same level as the SCOS and be longer than the scheme in [21] .
To prove the performance of the proposed scheme with the presence of multiple eavesdroppers, we present the comparison of the secrecy capacity and average service time delay when P 1 = 40dBm, 50dBm, 60dBm and multiple eavesdroppers exist near the terrestrial relays in Fig.8 and Fig.9 . The channel is set as average fading channel. Since there exist multiple eavesdroppers, the satellite could not apply NSBF to every specified eavesdroppers, the secrecy capacity with AF relay protocol would be affected and decrease, especially when P 1 is large. At this condition, the TLSS could still achieve the best secrecy capacity among these three schemes, while the scheme in [21] would choose AF relay protocol when the transmission power at the satellite is relatively low since it does not consider the secrecy performance and results to a decrease in secrecy capacity. The SCOS, on the contrary, only take secrecy performance into consideration, and leads to a relatively higher average service time delay.
We also present the comparison of the secrecy capacity and the average service time delay of the selection schemes with imperfect down-link CSI of the eavesdropper channel FIGURE 10. The comparison of the secrecy capacity at the terrestrial relays among the TLSS, SCOS and the scheme in [21] under three fading environments with P 1 = 40dBm and imperfect CSI. when P 1 = 40dBm in Fig.10 and Fig.11 . At this condition, the secrecy performance of three schemes faces a decrease. And the influence brought by the CSI estimation error to the AF relay protocol would not be larger than the influence brought to the DF relay protocol by the ASER. Thus the TLSS would prefer to select the AF protocol and the secrecy performance and the average service time delay of TLSS outperforms the other two schemes under all the channel fading conditions. It is worth noting that due to the inherent existing interference in the AF relay protocol, which is more influential when P 1 is small, and the influence of the estimation error, the secrecy capacity of achieved by the TLSS would reach a maximum point around P S = 50dBm and suffer a fall back after that.
The secrecy capacity of the terrestrial relays at the destination receiver and the theoretical upper bound of the secrecy capacity are demonstrated in Fig.12 . As it is shown in this figure, the simulation value and the upper bound would almost match with each other under the three fading conditions, which shows the maximum secrecy capacity could be achieved at the destination receiver with different transmission power at the terrestrial relays. The trend of the secrecy outage probability verses P ri and P 1 at the destination receiver is also presented in Fig.13 . The transmission power of the satellite is set as P S = 60dBm here. The figure demonstrates that the transmission power of the terrestrial relays has greater influence to the secrecy outage probability than the transmission power of the earth station. When these two transmission power increase around 35-40dBm, the outage probability would decrease around zero.
VI. CONCLUSION
In order to address the vulnerability of hybrid satelliteterrestrial networks against eavesdropper, we propose a three level AF/DF selection scheme (TLSS) that applying NSBF to the AF relay protocol and WFDCAN to the DF relay protocol. The ASER, secrecy capacity and service time delay constrain are taken into consideration when selecting the relay protocol to improve the reliability, the security and reduce the communication delay. These three criteria are divide into three levels according to their priority, which is considered as Reliability > Security > Delay. We also utilize the FH-MWFRFT to the terrestrial base station as a signal processing vector to minimize the interference brought by it. With the FH-MWFRFT signal processing vector, the signal transmitted by the terrestrial base station could further influence the receiving of the eavesdropper at the terrestrial relays. Moreover, a terrestrial relay selection scheme is also proposed to ensure the security at the destination receiver. We derive the upper bound of the secrecy capacity at the destination receiver to theoretically analyse the maximum value of it. We have demonstrated via the simulation results that 1)The proposed TLSS could achieve the best secrecy capacity among these three schemes and reduce the service time delay in some condition under the average and light fading channel and sacrifice some secrecy capacity to maintain the reliability under the heavy fading channel when the CSI is perfect. 2)When the CSI is not perfect, the TLSS would sacrifice more secrecy capacity under the heavy fading channel with a large earth station transmission power and when the transmission power of the earth station is relatively not large, the TLSS would outperform the other two schemes both in secrecy performance and service time delay.
3)The terrestrial relay selection scheme could ensure the secrecy capacity to approach the theoretical upper bound. When P S = 60dBm, the secrecy outage probability is good enough(near zero) when the transmission power of the earth station and the terrestrial relays are greater than 35-40dBm. The proposed schemes in this paper would benefit to the hybrid satellite-terrestrial communication network and to the combination of different relay protocols.
We could infer from (60) that 1 + γ iD 1 + γ iE 2 must be satisfied to ensure C sD > 0 Since the fraction number has property as
we could derive that
Then by substituting (44) and (45) into (62) and after some mathematical derivation, theorem 3 could be proved.
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